In this paper, we develop a data-driven algorithm to learn the Nash equilibrium solution for a two-player non-zero-sum (NZS) game with completely unknown linear discrete-time dynamics based on offpolicy reinforcement learning (RL). This algorithm solves the coupled algebraic Riccati equations (CARE) forward in time in a model-free manner by using the online measured data. We first derive the CARE for solving the two-player NZS game. Then, model-free off-policy RL is developed to obviate the requirement of complete knowledge of system dynamics. Besides, on-and off-policy RL algorithms are compared in terms of the robustness against the probing noise. Finally, a simulation example is presented to show the efficacy of the presented approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory is widely used in the complex decision-making problems where the collective behavior depends on the compilation of local interactions [1] , [2] . Many control problems with multiple decision-makers can be formulated within the game theory framework, such as the mixed H 2 /H ∞ control problem [3] and disturbance attenuation problem [4] for the centralized plant systems, consensus problem [5] - [7] and graphical game [8] , [9] for the multi-agent systems, etc. The cornerstone in static game theory was set by Nash [10] , [11] , where the study of the cooperative game is suggested to reduce to the non-cooperative form. In the zero-sum (ZS) game, each player's gain or loss is exactly balanced by the losses or gains of the other players, which captures competition among all players. In contrast, in the non-zero-sum (NZS) game, each player's gain (or loss) does not necessarily result in the other decision-makers' loss (or gain), which can be either competitive or cooperative game. In both cases, Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies with the property that no player can do better by unilaterally changing its own The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Jianxiang Xi . strategy. Based on the Hamilton-Jacobi (HJ) theory, Starr and Ho provided the sufficient condition, named the coupled HJ equations, for the existence of the feedback Nash equilibrium in the differential game [12] . Moreover, the coupled HJ equations become the coupled algebraic Riccati equation (CARE) for linear systems [13] . However, due to the intrinsic nonlinearity, solving the coupled HJ equations and/or CARE for general systems is challenging.
Nash equilibrium is the centerpiece in the game theory [14] . The existence and uniqueness are critical issues for the analysis and computation of the Nash equilibrium in game theory and applications. Nash proved the existence of a strategic equilibrium for the non-cooperative game and proposed the 'Nash program' to provide a way to obtain the Nash equilibrium [10] . In general cases, it turns out that a game may have more than one Nash equilibrium. Friedman discussed the conditions under which a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium can be guaranteed [15] . However, in the open-loop case, the Nash equilibrium depends heavily on the prescribed system trajectory determined by the initial condition. The openloop Nash equilibrium might not be optimal if there exists perturbation in the system trajectory. Therefore, the feedback Nash equilibrium synthesis, determined only by the current state, is desired. Lukes established sufficient condition for the uniqueness of the feedback Nash equilibrium [16] . The feedback Nash equilibrium is usually obtained by solving the CARE, which is difficult to be determined explicitly [17] . Many numerical methods, such as Lyapunov iteration [18] , Galerkin approximation [19] , and Newton method [20] , have been developed to approximate the solution to the CARE. However, existing numeric methods require the complete exact knowledge of the system dynamics and might be invalid if there exist model uncertainty and disturbances. The motivation of this paper is to tackle this issue by obviating the dependency on system knowledge.
Reinforcement learning (RL) is a bio-inspired methodology concerned with how the agents seek to take actions in an environment to maximize the cumulative reward [21] , [22] . Prokhorov and Wunsch presented a unified framework for RL methods using neural network adaptation, including Heuristic dynamic programming, dual heuristic programming, globalized dual heuristic programming, and their action-dependent versions [23] . Recently, RL algorithms have been successfully applied to control applications [24] , such as the optimal regulation problems [25] , [26] and optimal tracking problems [27] , robust stabilization problem [28] and eventtriggered controller design [29] - [31] for single-player systems. RL algorithms have also been used to solve the competitive and multi-player differential games for linear and nonlinear systems [32] . Iterative RL approaches have been developed in [33] to solve the ZS game. However, these results are off-line methods, which are not suitable for online implementation. Li et al. developed an integral RL approach to learn online the Nash equilibrium for a two-player ZS game [34] . Synchronous policy iteration algorithm [25] is extended for the ZS game [35] and the NZS game [36] . To relax the requirement of complete exact knowledge of system dynamics, adaptive identification techniques are combined with the actor-critic RL structure to solve the NZS game [36] - [38] . However, the results of identification-based RL method depends on the accuracy of the system identifier. Existing results on dynamical game problems are mainly for continuous-time systems. For discrete-time dynamical game problems, both the off-line iterative algorithm [39] and the policy iteration based online learning scheme still depends on system dynamics [40] . To avoid the identification error for discrete-time system, the action-dependent heuristic dynamic programming approach is presented in [41] . However, the learning convergence and the closed-loop stability analysis are not investigated. Therefore, to tackle this issue, a novel model-free method is developed in this paper with stability and convergence discussions for the NZS game without the system identification procedure.
Based on the policy used in the learning phase, the RL variants can be classified as on-and off-policy RL approaches [42] . In the on-policy RL, the policy in learning has to be implemented to the system for implementation, where the learning process has great impacts on the closedloop stability. In contrast, the off-policy RL includes the implementation phase and the learning phase. The implementation phase is driven by the behavior policy, which is independent of the policy in the learning phase. It is well known that the Q-learning algorithm for Markov decision process is a typical off-policy RL approach. However, the Qlearning algorithm for control problems, such as [43] , [44] , is essentially on-policy RL since the policy applied to the system is simultaneously being evaluated by the critic network [42] . Off-policy RL has been used for nonlinear ZS game [45] , [46] , and NZS game [47] in continuous time. Developing off-policy RL algorithms for discrete-time linear systems is not straightforward because both system matrix A and control matrix B appears in the policy update equation. In this paper, the linear-quadratic theory is employed to build a complete basis for the actor-critic representation for the NZS of discrete-time linear dynamical systems. The contributions of this paper are as follows.
• The necessary and sufficient condition of the feedback Nash equilibrium of the NZS for the discrete-time linear system is derived explicitly, which yields the CARE. Also, the closed-loop stability of the solution to the CARE is discussed.
• A novel model-free algorithm is developed for the discrete-time systems to solve the NZS game to obviate the requirement of complete knowledge of system dynamics.
• The on-and off-policy variants of RL algorithms are developed and compared in terms of robustness against the probing noise in the control input. It is shown that there is no estimation bias in the off-policy RL algorithm. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides the problem statement of the two-player NZS game for linear discrete-time systems. The CAREs are derived to solve the NZS game. In Section III, model-based on-and off-policy RL algorithms are developed and compared in terms of the robustness against the probing noise. Model-free off-policy RL is developed in Section IV to obviate the requirement of complete knowledge of system dynamics. Simulations are conducted in Section V. Section VI gives the concluding remarks of the overall paper.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT A. TWO-PLAYER NONZERO-SUM GAME
Consider the discrete-time linear dynamical system with twoplayers
where x k ∈ R n is the state, u k ∈ R m 1 is player one and v k ∈ R m 2 is player two. Assumption 1: The matrix pair
For each player, the associated cost is defined as
with
where Q j ≥ 0, R jj > 0 and R ji > 0 for ∀j, i ∈ {1, 2}. Definition 1 (Admissible Control) [48] : A feedback control pair µ = {u, v} is defined to be admissible with respect to the system (1), denoted as µ ∈ , if • u (·) and v (·) are continuous;
the policies u(·) and v(·)
are finite for ∀x k . In this paper, it is desirable to find the optimal admissible control pair µ * = {u * , v * } such that the cost function (2) is minimized. The control pair µ * = {u * , v * } corresponds to the Nash equilibrium of the NZS game defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Nash Equilibrium Strategies) [14] : An twotuple of policies µ * = {u * , v * } with µ ∈ is said to constitute a Nash equilibrium for a two-player game, if the following inequalities holds,
By using the value functions (2), for player one, the value function V 1 (x k ) satisfies
Note that
Then, one can obtain the Bellman equation
Based on the linear quadratic theory, if the players utilize the linear feedback u k = Kx k and v k = Lx k , the value function for each player one should be in the quadratic form as
Then, the Bellman equation (5) for each player becomes
Remark 1: The Bellman equation only quantifies the relation between the admissible control policy and its corresponding value function for each player. For the optimal case, the Nash equilibrium is captured by the CARE, which is to be discussed in the next subsection.
B. COUPLED ALGEBRAIC RICCATI EQUATIONS
In this subsection, the necessary and sufficient conditions for the Nash equilibrium of the NZS game are derived analytically.
Define the Hamiltonian for each player as
The necessary condition for optimality [49] yields
which is equivalent to
Then, one can obtain
According to Definition 2 and equation (10), the Nash Equilibrium satisfies
which can be written as
Inserting (12) into (13) yields
Note
Then, (14) is equivalent to
with K * defined as in (18) (as shown at bottom of this page). Similarly, for player two, one has
with L * defined as in (19) (as shown at bottom of this page). The equations (16) and (17) are referred to as CARE. The next theorem states that feedback Nash equilibrium pair (P * 1 , P * 2 ) can be completely characterized by symmetric stabilizing solutions of equations (16) and (17) . That is, the symmetric stabilizing solutions (P * 1 , P * 2 ) to the CARE (16) and (17) are sufficient and necessary conditions for the Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 1: Under Assumption 1, consider the system (1) with the performance functions defined by (2) . Then, the following propositions hold.
1) Let (P * 1 , P * 2 ) be a pair of symmetric stabilizing solutions to equations (16) and (17) . Define the feedback gains (K * , L * ) as in (18) and (19) . Then, (K * , L * ) is a feedback Nash equilibrium pair.
2) Suppose that (K * , L * ) is a feedback Nash equilibrium pair, there exist symmetric stabilizing solutions (P * 1 , P * 2 ) to equations (16) and (17) such that (K * , L * ) can be expressed in terms of (P * 1 , P * 2 ) as in (18) and (19) . Proof: 1) First, for player one, consider the cost function
subject to the dynamic constraints
Applying Lemma 2 in the APPENDIX to (21) with the performance (20) , then, the necessary and sufficient condition for the optimum can be expressed as
Applying the matrix inversion lemma [50] to the matrix M in (11) yields,
.
where M 11 , M 12 , M 21 and M 22 are as defined in (11) . Based on equations (15), (23) and (24), K * can be rewritten as
Inserting K * in (25) to equation (16) yields
From (26) and (22), it is obvious that X = P * 1 is a stabilizing solution to equation (22) .
Then, the algebraic matrix equation (22) has a stabilizing solution X = P * 1 . Thus, the above minimization problem has a solution given by u
That is
In a similar way it can be shown that the corresponding minimization problem for player two is solved by L * , which proves the first part of the claim.
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2) Next, since (K * , L * ) ∈ is a feedback Nash equilibrium. Then, the following holds
L , for ∀x 0 ∈ R n and the feedback gains satisfying (K * , L) ∈ and (K , L * ) ∈ . According to Lemma 2, there exist real symmetric matrices (P * 1 , P * 2 ) satisfying the set of equations
From Lemma 2, it implies that the optimal performance takes quadratic form, i.e., J i (x 0 , K * , L * ) = x T 0 P * i x 0 and the optimal control feedback K * and L * can be expressed as in (18) and (19) . Taking L * in (19) to equation (27) and K * in (18) to equation (28) yields the CARE (16) and (17) . Furthermore, by inserting K * in (18) 
The CARE (16) and (17) are difficult to be solved directly since they are nonlinear in P 1 and P 2 . Many approximation algorithms have been developed to solve (16) and (17) in an iterative manner. One of such algorithms, named off-line policy iteration algorithm, can be introduced as in Algorithm 1. By iteratively solving the Lyapunov equations (29) and (30), which are linear for P i 1 , P i 2 , and updating K i , L i by (31) and (32) , as shown at the bottom of this page, the pair (P i 1 , P i 2 ) converges to the solutions (P * 1 , P * 2 ) to the CARE (16) and (17) asymptotically [13] .
III. MODEL-BASED ADAPTIVE DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING
In Section II, an off-line algorithm is developed to solve CARE (16) and (17), which are sufficient and necessary conditions for the Nash equilibrium. In contrast, the online method for solving the CARE is developed.
A. ON-POLICY RL ALGORITHM
Consider the iterative policy in i-th iteration u i k = K i x k for player one and v i k = L i x k for player two. Then the dynamics 
where K i , L i ,with i = 1, 2, · · · ,are defined recursively by (31) and (32) . 3 : Policy Improvement Step: Update the iterative feedback gain K i+1 and L i+1 according to (31) and (32) . 4: 
can be written as
Then the on-policy Bellman equations for each player can be written as
Based on the Kronecker product, (34) can be rewritten as
for j = 1, 2 · · · , N . The compact form of the Bellman equation can be written as the following least square (LS) equation,
with ξ i = vec(P i 1 ). Similarly, for player two, one has
with ψ i = vec(P i 2 ). The feedback gain K i for player one and L i for player two can be updated by (31) and (32) .
Algorithm 2
Model-Based On-Policy RL Algorithm 1: Begin with K 0 and L 0 , set i = 0. 2: Policy Evaluation Step: Evaluate policies u i (·) and v i (·) by solving solve equation (37) for ξ i and equation (38) for ψ i : 3: Policy Improvement Step: Update the iterative feedback gain K i+1 and L i+1 according to (31) and (32) . 4: 
To this end, the on-policy RL algorithm can be summarized in Algorithm 2. Note that (36) is a scalar equation, and P i 1 , P i 2 ∈ R n×n are symmetric matrices with n × (n + 1) /2 independent elements. Therefore, at least n × (n + 1) /2 data sets are required to be collected for solving (36) using the LS method. From (37) and (38) , it is known that the matrix should have independent rows to guarantee the existence and uniqueness of the solutions ξ i and ψ i . This requirement can be guaranteed by the well-known persistence of excitation (PE) condition.
Definition 3: (PE condition) [51] : A q-vector sequence h = [ h 1 · · · h q ] T is said to be persistently exciting over an
Note that if l < q, (39) cannot be satisfied. Inserting the policies u i k = K i x k and v i k = L i x k into the system dynamics (33) one can obtain x k+1 =Ā i x k and
Therefore, the vectors {γ i } would be linearly dependent on each other if the system dynamics satisfy (33) and the existence of solutions to LS equations (37) and (38) can not be guaranteed. In order to guarantee the full column rank of the matrix , probing noise with PE property and sufficient rich information is desired. For more discussions on PE condition, readers are referred to [51] and [42] for more details.
To satisfy the PE condition (39) in Algorithm 2, probing noise is added to the system dynamics (1) . Then, the actual control input applied to the system for data collection iŝ
with e 1k , e 2k being the probing noise and u i k = K i x k , v i k = L i x k . The following lemma shows that probing noise may lead to biased solutions to the on-policy Bellman equations (34) and (35) .
Lemma 1 (Effect of probing noise on Algorithm 2): Let P i 1 and P i 2 be the solutions to (34) (35) with e 1k = 0, e 2k = 0 in (40) andP i 1 ,P i 2 be the solution to (34) (35) with e 1k = 0, e 2k = 0 in (40) . Then, P i 1 =P i 1 and P i 2 =P i 2 . Proof: Let (34) and (35) 
, which is the undithered Bellman equation (34) plus seven terms depending on probing noise. Then,P i 1 is not the same as P i 1 . Similarly,P i 2 is not the same as P i 2 . This completes the proof.
As shown by Lemma 1, the dithered Bellman equation (41) and the Bellman equation (34), (35) do not have the same solution. That is, the probing noise would lead to a bias estimation when using the on-policy RL algorithm. In addition, from (37) and (38) , the probing noise is needed to guarantee the existence of LS solutions ξ i and ψ i . Therefore, the unbiased solution to the LS equation (37) and (38) can not be obtained by the on-policy RL algorithm with probing noise. In the next subsection, a novel RL variant solving the NZS game is developed to tackle this issue.
B. OFF-POLICY RL ALGORITHM
In this subsection, another variant of the RL algorithm, offpolicy RL method, is developed as follows.
The system dynamics can be equivalently rewritten as
In (42) , the learning policies are u i k = K i x k and v i k = L i x k . On the other hand, u k and w k are the behavior policies that are actually applied to the system dynamics to generate the data for collection.
The on-policy Bellman equation for player one
The Taylor expansion of the any quadratic function f (x) at point y is
Then, the left-hand side of (43) becomes
Consider the Lyapunov equation in the policy evaluation,
multiplying both sides of (46) by x T k and x k yields
Inserting (47) into (45) yields the off-policy Bellman equation
Similarly, for player two, one has
Algorithm 3 Model-Based Off-Policy RL Algorithm 1: Begin with K 0 and L 0 , set i = 0. 2: Policy Evaluation Step: Evaluate policies u i (·) and v i (·) by solving solve equation (48) for P i 1 and equation (49) for P i 2 : 3: Policy Improvement Step: Update the iterative feedback gain K i+1 and L i+1 according to (31) and (32) . 4: 
where ε i m i = 1, 2 is a predetermined error bound; Otherwise, go to Step 2.
Based on the above off-policy RL Bellman equations, the offpolicy RL algorithm can be summarized in Algorithm 3 In the next theorem, it is shown that one can be approximate the solution to the CARE (16) and (17) by iteratively solving the off-policy Bellman equations (48) and (49) .
Theorem 2 (Equivalence Between Algorithms 2 and 3): Algorithms 2 and 3 are equivalent in the sense that the equations (34) and (35) , and the equations (48) and (49) have the same solutions.
Proof: For player one, insertingĀ i = A + B 1 K i + B 2 L i and equation (1) into the off-policy Bellman equation (48) yields
By eliminating the common terms in (50), one has
Rearranging the terms in (51) yields
For player two, the off-policy Bellman equation (49) can be rewritten as
Then, the on-policy Bellman equations (34) and (35) are equivalent to the off-policy Bellman equations (48) and (49), respectively. This completes the proof.
Theorem 3 (Effect of Probing Noise on Algorithm 3): Let
where e 1k , e 2k are the probing noises. Denote (P i 1 ,P i 2 ) be the solution to (48) and (49) when e 1k = 0, e 2k = 0 and (P i 1 , P i 2 ) be the solution to (48) and (49) when e 1k = e 2k = 0. ThenP i 1 = P i 1 andP i 2 = P i 2 . Proof: 1) When e 1k = 0, e 2k = 0, the off-policy Bellman equation (48) with the dithered policiesû k andv k can be expressed as
Insertingû k = u k + e 1k ,v k = v k + e 2k into (54) yields
Taking (42) into (55) , and considering the facts in (55)
one can obtain
2) When e 1k = e 2k = 0, one has u k = u k . Then, the offpolicy Bellman equation (48) and (49) can be written as
and
where P i 1 , P i 2 are obtained by solving (58) and (59). By comparing (56) and (58), it can be concluded that P i 1 solves (56) . Similarly, one can find that P i 2 also solves (57). Therefore, the probing noise in Algorithm 3 does not result in a biased policy evaluation. This completes the proof.
IV. MODEL-FREE ADAPTIVE DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING
In this section, we derive an equivalent form of Algorithm 3 which does not require comple knowledge of the system dynamics.
Based on the off-policy Bellman equation (48) for player one, one has
Inserting (42) into (48) and applying the Kronecker product yield
Then, one can obtain the compact form of Bellman equation for player two as
where
Also, there are N 1 unknown parameters in Y i and at least N 1 distinct samples should be collected to solve equation (64) for Y i . To this end, one has the following LS equation
After solving the LS equations (61) and (64), by inserting (60) and (63) into (31) and (32), respectively, one has
which is the update rule for the feedback gain K i for player one and L i for player two. Finally, the model-free off-policy RL algorithm can be summarized in Algorithm 4. From the above discussions, we have the following corollary. Corollary 1: The Algorithms 3 and 4 are equivalent to each other in the sense that the equations (61), (64) and the equations (48) , (49) have the same solution.
Similar to (37) and (38) , the probing noise is needed to guarantee the existence of the LS equations (61) and (64). As shown by Theorem 3, the off-policy Bellman equation (48) and the dithered off-policy Bellman equation (55) have the same solution. Therefore, the off-policy RL algorithm is robust against the probing noise, and the solutions to LS equations (61) and (64) can be obtained by Algorithm 4. Moreover, the on-policy RL algorithm requires model knowledge (B 1 , B 2 ) for policy improvement. In contrast, the offpolicy RL algorithm is a data-driven method that does not need any model knowledge.
In Algorithms 1 -4, the iterative kernel matrices P i 1 , P i 2 and the iterative feedback gains K i , L i are updated until the conditions P i 1 − P i+1 1 ≤ ε 1 and P i 2 − P i+1 2 ≤ ε 2 are satisfied with the L −2-norm · . The stopping criterion parameter ε i determines the ultimate learning accuracy toward the optimum. As discussed in [52] , the stopping criterion with parameter ε i would results in an ε i -optimal learning result, i.e.,
For more details about the effect of the parameter ε i on the learning accuracy, readers are referred to [52] for more details.
An initial admissible policy is required in the proposed offpolicy RL algorithm. If the matrix A is stable, then the initial policy for each player could be selected as u i = 0. Otherwise, partial knowledge of the system is required to obtain the initial admissible policy. Suppose that matrix A is obtained from a nominal system, i.e., A = A 0 + . Then, based on robust control techniques, one can obtain an admissible policy. However, the learning process does not require any knowledge of the nominal dynamics A 0 and finds an optimal control protocol for the original system despite uncertainties in the dynamics.
V. SIMULATION
Note that the target on the policy design for each player is not only system stabilization, but also finding the Nash equilibrium of the non-zero-sum game as defined in Definition 2. Therefore, to be consistent with the system formulation as in (1), we have two control inputs for the discrete-time system with each representing the player in the NZS game. Similar to existed literature on the NZS game [40] , [41] , [53] for nonlinear systems, we use numeric examples of linear dynamical systems in the simulation to validate the algorithm developed in this paper. This section presents a simulation example to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed off-policy reinforcement learning algorithm. The linear system (1) with the following system matrix and control input dynamic matrix is considered, Convergence of off-line on-policy RL Algorithm 1. P * 1 ,P * 2 ,K * and L * corresponds to the optimal case, where as P i 1 ,P i 2 , K i and L i denotes the iterative approximation in i-th iteration. The iterative learning process achieves satisfactory result after 3 iterations.
For the NZS game, the weight matrices are selected as
A. CASE 1: OFFLINE RL ALGORITHM 1
In this subsection, the offline policy iteration Algorithm 1 is used to solve the CARE (16) and (17) iteratively. The system trajectories in each iteration is shown in Figure 1 , with the value function approximation error shown in Figure 2 . At convergence, one can obtain the solution to the the CARE (16) and (17) with the corresponding feedback Nash equilibrium K * = 0.0086 0.0272 −0.0667 L * = −0.6444 −0.8736 0.0005 .
In the following, the above results are considered as a baseline for comparison between variants of RL algorithms.
B. CASE 2: ON-POLICY RL ALGORITHM 2 WITH PROBING NOISE
We first implement Algorithm 2 to find the solution of the CARE. The iterative learning process begins from the following admissible initial policy
The following probing noise is added into each player to guarantee the full rank of the regressor matrix in LS equations (61) and (64)
where e 1 (k) is added to the iterative policy u k = Kx k and e 2 (k) is added to the iterative policy v k = Lx k , respectively. Then, the convergence of the on-policy RL Algorithm 2 is shown in Figure 3 . As illustrated by Lemma 2, adding the probing noise to the on-policy RL algorithm yields a bias in the learning process. One can observe that the iterative learning matrices P i 1 , P i 2 do not converge. Also, there exist nonzero residuals between the iterative feedback gains(K i , L i ) and the optimal feedback gains (K * , L * ). Therefore, the effect of the probing noise on the on-policy RL algorithm can not be neglected. Convergence of the off-policy RL algorithm with probing noise (68). P * 1 , P * 2 K * and L * represents the optimal case, where as P i 1 , P i 2 , K i and L i denotes the learning in i -th iteration.
C. CASE 3: OFF-POLICY RL ALGORITHM 4 WITH PROBING NOISES
In this subsection, the results of the proposed off-policy RL Algorithm 4 is investigated. First, the initial policy applied to the system (1) is selected the same as in (67). Then, two types of probing noises are added into each player, i.e., for the second case. For the data collection phase, the probing noises is added to the behavior policy until 200 steps. Then, the learning process begins from the same initial admissible policy for the system (1) as given in (67). After the 200-th Convergence of the off-policy RL algorithm with probing noise (69). P * 1 , P * 2 , K * and L * represents the optimal case, where as P i 1 , P i 2 , K i and L i denotes the learning in i -th iteration.
step, the learning phase starts until the value function matrices P i 1 and P i 2 converges to the optimal case. Then, the learning policies K i and L i are implemented to the system (1) for the rest time, as shown in Figures 4 and 6 , respectively. The norm of learning errors between the iterative control gains K i and K * , L i and L * , between the iterative learning value function matrix P i and optimal value function matrix P * are shown in Figures 5 and 7 , respectively. One can observe that the iterative value function matrix (P i 1 , P i 2 ) converge to the solution to the CARE (17) and (18) (P * 1 , P * 2 ), respectively, as the iteration continues. In addition, in both cases, the learning errors for the gains K i and L i converge to the optimal gains K * and L * , regardless of the probing noise in the behavior policy.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we develop an on-and off-policy variants of reinforcement learning algorithm to learn online the Nash equilibrium solution for the two-player NZS game of linear discrete-time (DT) dynamics. First, the CARE is derived to solve the NZS games and prove that the stabilizing solutions to the CARE are sufficient and necessary conditions for the Nash equilibria. Then, off-policy reinforcement learning is used to solve the NZS games using only measured data instead of the system dynamics. Moreover, compared with the on-policy RL method, it is shown theoretically that the off-policy RL method has two main advantages. First, off-policy is robust to the probing noise, i.e., there is no bias as a result of adding a probing noise to the control input to satisfy the condition of the persistence of excitation. In addition, off-policy RL is a model-free method, which is in contrast to the model-based on-policy RL method. Finally, a simulation example is given to verify the effectiveness of the presented off-policy RL algorithm. Future work will extend the results in this paper to the case of underactuated mechanical systems [54] and multiagent systems [55] , [56] .
APPENDIX LINEAR QUADRATIC THEORY
Consider the discrete-time system
where y k is the state and z k is the control input. The optimal control problem of system (70) is to find a feedback law z k = F * y k such that, under the additional constraint that lim k→∞ y k = 0, the following performance is minimized for ∀y 0 ∈ R n ,
where Q, R 0. The imposed stabilization constraint is equivalent to the requirement that the feedback is stabilizable, which is guaranteed by the assumption that the pair (A, B) is stabilizable. We denote the set of stabilizable linear feedback laws as
According to the linear quadratic theory, the necessary and sufficient condition for the solution to the optimal control problem above can be summarized as follows.
Lemma 2: Assume that (A, B) is stabilizable and z k = Fy k , with F ∈ F. The optimal control problem of system (70) with the performance (71) has an optimal fedback gain F * ∈ F for J (F) if and only if the algebraic Riccati equation (73) has a symmetric stabilizing solution P. 
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